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CLASS ACTIONS UNDER CAFA AND PARENS PATRIAE ACTIONS:
WEST VIRGINIA EX REL MCGRAW V. CVS PHARMACY, INC.
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)' gives federal district courts
jurisdiction over certain civil actions that are "class actions" and meet CAFA's
amount in controversy and minimal diversity requirements. The relevant portion
of CAFA states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in
which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and is a class action in which... any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant .... 2
CAFA defines "class action" as "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial
procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative
persons as a class action." 3 Rule 23(a), which lays out specific class action
requirements, specifically states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.4
In West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,5 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether an
action by the West Virginia Attorney General brought pursuant to state statutes,
which in part sought to recompense individual consumers, was a class action that
was removable under CAFA. The Fourth Circuit, in a split opinion, affirmed
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). CAFA's diversity rules are more
extensive, but these other sections apply solely when either the plaintiff or defendant is a foreign
state, see § 1332(d)(2)(B)-(C), and therefore, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
3. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
5. 646 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 761 (2011).
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the West Virginia District Court and held that the action was not a class action
that was removable under CAFA.7
I. DiSmicT COURT OPINION
On August 24, 2009, the State of West Virginia, purporting to act in its
"sovereign and quasi-sovereign capacity" and through the West Virginia
Attorney General, commenced an action in state court against six pharmacy
companies (Pharmacies), alleging that the companies "sold generic drugs to
West Virginia consumers without passing along to the consumers the cost
savings of generic drugs over brand name equivalents."8  According to the
attorney general, this violated the West Virginia Pharmacy Act, which mandates
that any savings in the price of generic prescriptions must be passed on to the
purchaser,9 and the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (WVCCPA),
"which prohibits 'unfair or deceptive' trade practices and the collection of
'excess charges."' 10 The attorney general sought injunctive relief, restitution and
disgorgement of money received from the excess charges, repayment to
individual West Virginia consumers, civil penalties, interest, and costs."
On September 10, 2009, the Pharmacies removed the action, asserting,
among other grounds, that the action was removable under CAFA because it
was a "disguised class action" brought on behalf of individual consumers." In
their notice of removal, the Pharmacies pointed to count III of the complaint,
which dealt with the reimbursement of excess charges for consumers.' 3 Under
West Virginia Code § 46A-7-111(1), if "an excess charge has been made, the
court shall order the [defendant] to refund to the consumer the amount of the
excess charge."'14  The Pharmacies also argued that CAFA's numerosity,
amount in controversy, and diversity requirements were met with regard to
count 111.15 Further, the Pharmacies argued that the suit by the attorney general
was brought in a representative capacity because the attorney general "was
seeking refunds on behalf of each affected West Virginia purchaser of generic
drugs," and thus, the action "was a representational proceeding, qualifying as a
'class action' under CAFA."'16 On October 13, 2009, the attorney general filed
7. Id. at 172.
8. Id. at 171-72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. Id. at 172 (citing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-12b(g)).
10. Id. at 172-73 (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-6-104, 46A-7-1 11).
11. Id. at 173.
12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id.
14. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-111(1).
15. McGraw, 646 F.3d at 173. The Pharmacies argued that the minimal diversity
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) was satisfied because the Pharmacies were not West
Virginia citizens. Id.
16. Id.
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a motion to remand.17 The district court granted the motion to remand, holding
that the attorney general's action was a parens patriae action 18 that is neither a
"class action" nor a "mass action" under CAFA.19 Of particular importance to
the district court in making this determination was the fact that under the
WVCCPA, the attorney general could act on his own rather than having to act
based on consumer complaints. Further, the district court found that the
attorney general's "paramount goal[s]" in initiating the action against the
Pharmacies were to disgorge the Pharmacies of any and all gains obtained
through the collection of excess charges, seek civil penalties for the state, and
warn future violators-goals "separate and apart from the interests of particular
consumers in obtaining recompense."
21
If. FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINION
A. Majority
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision to
22remand the case. In the majority opinion, authored by Judge Niemeyer and
joined by Judge Davis, the court held that the attorney general's action was not a
class action under CAFA because the action "was not brought under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or a 'similar statute or rule of judicial procedure
authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more persons as a class action."23
17. West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 580, 582 (S.D.
W. Va. 2010), affid, 646 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2011).
18. Parens patriae refers to "[a] doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a
lawsuit on behalf of a citizen." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). In order for a
state to maintain a parens patriae action, "'the State must articulate an interest apart from the
interests of particular private parties,' also known as a 'quasi-sovereign interest."' McGraw, 646
F.3d at 180 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel.
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). There are two recognized categories of quasi-sovereign interests:
"(1) a state's interest in the physical and economic well-being of its citizens in general, and (2) a
state's interest in 'not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system."'
Id. (quoting Barez, 458 U.S. at 607).
19. McGraw, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 597. Mass actions are also removable under CAFA and
have slightly different requirements than class actions:
"[M]ass action" means any civil action .. . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or
more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims
involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over
those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirements under [§ 13321(a).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2006). Mass actions do not include actions in which "all of the
claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual
claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such
action." § 1332(d)( ll)(B)(ii)(lI).
20. McGraw, 646 F.3d at 173 (quoting McGraw, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 593).
21. Id. (citing McGraw, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 593, 594) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id. at 179.
23. Id. at 171, 177-78 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B)).
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The Pharmacies first argued that, although the attorney general did not label
the State's action as a class action, the court must look to the substance of the
action rather than merely how the action is labeled to determine whether the
action is a class action under the CAFA. 24 The Pharmacies contended that the
statutes under which the attorney general brought the action were similar state
statutes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The court noted that "[a] state
statute or rule is 'similar' to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 if it closely'
resembles Rule 23 or is like Rule 23 in substance or in essentials."
Specifically, as required under CAFA, "the state statute or rule must resemble or
be like Rule 23 by 'authorizing an action to be brought by one or more
representative persons as a class action.' '27 The court found that Congress
intended that class action be defined "in terms of its similarity and close
,,28resemblance to Rule 23. Thus, according to the court, an action that is
brought pursuant to a state statute will only be a CAFA class action if the action
is representative in nature and the four criteria stated in Rule 23(a) are satisfied:
"numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 29 In
further articulating the similarity standard the court stated:
[W]hile a "similar" state statute or rule need not contain all of the other
conditions and administrative aspects of Rule 23, it must, at a minimum,
provide a procedure by which a member of a class whose claim is
typical of all members of the class can bring an action not only on his
own behalf but also on behalf of all others in the class, such that it
would not be unfair to bind all class members to the judgment entered
for or against the representative party.
30
In other words, the state statute authorizing the action must contain the four
requirements in Rule 23(a) to be a "similar" state statute under CAFA.
The court noted that the state consumer protection statutes under the
authority of which the attorney general acted in commencing the action "contain
virtually none of the essential requirements for a Rule 23 class action."
31
Importantly, the attomey general was not "designated as a member of the class
whose claim would be typical of the claims of class members." 32 Instead, under
24. See id. at 174 (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 424
(5th Cir. 2008)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 1161 (1lth ed. 2007)).
27. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 174-75 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). For the specific language of Rule 23(a), see
supra text accompanying note 4.
30. Id. at 175 (footnote omitted). The court noted that West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
23 would, had it been invoked, have satisfied this "similarity" standard. Id.
31. Id. at 175-76.
32. Id. at 176.
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the authority of the West Virginia statutes, the attorney general could act on his
own, "independently of any consumer complaints, as a parens patriae.'" The
court stated that the fact that the attorney general was seeking state interests such
as "disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, 'separate and apart from the interests of
particular consumers in obtaining recompense,' validate[d the attorney general's]
action as a parens patriae action. '34 In addition, the West Virginia statutes did
not contain any numerosity, commonality, or tpicality requirements
whatsoever, "all of which are essential to a class action."
The Pharmacies argued that the action was still a "disguised class action"
because under count III "the attorney general acts on behalf of the citizens, each
of whom allegedly suffered a common injury.' 36 However, the court maintained
that this type of representative action is still not a class action, as a class action
requires that the individual filing the action actually be a member of that class
"whose claim is typical of the class members' claims." 37 The court noted that
the West Virginia Attorney General's role in bringing the suit was like that of an
"EEOC or other regulator when it brings an action on behalf of a large group of
employees or a segment of the public," representative actions which the Supreme
Court of the United States has held not to be class actions under Rule 23. In
General Telephone Co. v. EEOC,39 the Supreme Court held that a sex-
discrimination suit brought by the EEOC under Title VII which sought
injunctive relief and back pay for a number of affected employees was not a
class action subject to the requirements of Rule 23. 40 Furthermore, in In re
Edmond,4' the Fourth Circuit held that "a bankruptcy claim brought by the
Maryland Attorney General's office 'on behalf of itself and all [affected
Maryland] consumers' did not need to comply with Rule 23, even though one of
the claim's primary purposes was to provide individual citizens with refunds
pursuant Maryland's Consumer Protection Act."4 2  Thus, although the
WVCCPA, not dissimilar from the statutes at issue in General Telephone and
Edmond, gave the attorney general authority to seek relief for individual citizens,
the court reiterated that the action was not a class action because neither West
Virginia nor the attorney general was a member of the supposed class and did
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 580,
593 (S.D. W. Va. 2010), aff'd, 646 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2011)). The court made clear that it was not
required to find that the action was a parens patriae action in order to determine that the action was
not brought under a statute "similar" to Rule 23. Id. at 176 n.2.
35. McGraw, 646 F.3d at 176. Those statutes also "authorized the [aittorney [g]eneral to
proceed without providing notice to overcharged consumers, which would be essential in a Rule 23
class action . I..." ld.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 177 (citing General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 334 & n.16 (1980)).
39. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
40. Id. at 320, 321, 324, 334 n.16.
41. 934 F.2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1991).
42. McGraw, 646 F.3d at 177 (citing Edmond, 934 F.2d at 1306) (alteration in original).
1103
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not suffer injuries of the same kind as the members-the West Virginia
citizens-of that supposed class.43 Accordingly, the court held that the district
court did not err in remanding the case because the attorney general's action was
not a class action brought under a state statute that was similar to Rule 23.44
The court ended its opinion with a discussion of the state sovereignty
reasons for its decision. The court noted that if it were to hold that the attorney
general's action had to be pursued in federal court rather than state court, the
court "would risk trampling on the sovereign dignity of the State and
inappropriately transforming what is essentially a West Virginia matter into a
federal case." ,'  The central federal interest of CAFA's removal provisions is
that federal courts should decide "interstate case[s] of national importance,"'
46
However, "CAFA is also sensitive to deeply-rooted principles of federalism,
reserving to the States primarily local matters." 47 The court made clear that in a
case such as this, "where West Virginia has raised no federal question and where
all persons on whose behalf West Virginia has filed this action are West Virginia
citizens, the 'claim of sovereign protection from removal [arises] in its most
powerful form.' ' 48  Thus, "a federal court should be most reluctant to
compel ... removal" and should only do so "when removal serves an overriding
federal interest., 49  Moreover, "[c]omity demands that [courts] step most
carefully before 'snatch[ing] cases which a State has brought from the courts of
that State unless some clear rule demands it."'' 50 The court indicated that there is
no precedent enunciating a clear rule that "'a state as a plaintiff suing defendants
over whom it has regulatory authority in state court under its own state laws may
be removed to federal court,' except when the state raises a federal question.""
Consequently, the court held that CAFA did not "clearly demand" that the action
by the West Virginia Attorney General be removed, despite the fact that the
Pharmacies were not citizens of West Virginia.
52
43. Id. The court also looked to the legislative history of CAFA but concluded that it "[was]
hardly probative." Id.
44. Id. at 177-78.
45. Id. at 178.
46. Id. (quoting CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 2008))
(alteration in original).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 179 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Contr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S.
Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 21 n.22 (1983)).
51. Id. at 178-79 (quoting Katrina Breaches, 524 F.3d at 711).
52. Id. at 179.
[VOL. 63: 10991104
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B. Dissent
Judge Gilman from the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation, dissented.
53
Taking a markedly different approach from the majority, Judge Gilman found
that the attorney 9eneral's action was a class action brought under a similar
statute to Rule 23. Judge Gilman stated that class action should be defined as
"[a] lawsuit in which the court authorizes a single a person or a small group of
people to represent the interests of a larger group,"55 and that the attorney
general's action "squarely fits" within that definition. 56  He dismissed the
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation as "'bells and whistles' whose absence in the pleadings do not
prevent the [a]ttorney [g]eneral's suit from being considered a class action under
CAFA." 57 Judge Gilman averred that a court must evaluate the "essence" of the
action, and whether the West Virginia Attorney General's action was a class
action under CAFA turned on "who the real party in interest" was in the case.
58
Judge Gilman elaborated:
If West Virginia is the real party in interest, then this is a proper parens
patriae action over which the federal courts lack jurisdiction. On the
other hand, if the real parties in interest are the... consumers, and the
state is only a nominal party, then... [there is] jurisdiction under
CAFA.59
Judge Gilman further noted that he would adopt a "claim-by-claim approach" in
deciding whether a state has in fact acted in a parens patriae capacity and
brought the action in furtherance of a "quasi-sovereign interest."
6
Judge Gilman heavily relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Louisiana ex
rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co. in evaluating the action in the present
case.6 1 In Caldwell, the Louisiana Attorney General filed a lawsuit in state court
against several insurance companies, seeking, among other things, treble
53. Id. at 179 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 185.




58. Id. at 179-80.
59. Id. at 180 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 180, 181 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458
U.S. 592, 607 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority describes the "claim-by-
claim approach" by the dissent as if "Count III does not state a valid parens patriae claim [then] the
action as a whole must be classified as a class action." Id. at 176 n.2 (majority opinion). See supra
note 18 for a discussion ofparens patriae actions and quasi-sovereign interests.
61. Mcgraw, 646 F.3d at 181 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (citing Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 422-23,430 (5th Cir. 2008)).
1105
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damages on behalf of individual citizens of the state. 62  While the attorney
63general labeled the action as parens patriae, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the real parties in interest with regard to the treble damages claim were the
individual citizens.64 The Fifth Circuit held that the requirements for a CAFA
mass action were easily met and as such, the action was properly removed.
65
Judge Gilman, in the present case, stated that he believed that the "primary
thrust" of the attorney general's suit was count III, under which the attorney
general sought recompense for individual citizens. 66 In reaching this conclusion,
Judge Gilman noted that if a court found that the Pharmacies had actually
overcharged the consumers then the WVCCPA mandates that the consumers be
compensated, whereas the "injunctive relief and any civil penalties are
discretionary with the court and require more stringent proof on the part of the
[a]ttorney [g]eneral." 67 Thus, because the injunctive relief and civil penalties
could succeed only if the reimbursement claims were successful, then those
claims should be considered as subsidiary to the primary claim for
reimbursement. While admitting that the subsidiary claims for injunctive relief
and civil penalties would fall under parens patriae authority, Judge Gilman
stated that "the West Virginia Attorney General ... does not have a quasi-
sovereign interest in the refunds that the Pharmacies will be required to pay
directly to the affected consumers if they are found to have violated the
WVCCPA. Thus, according to Judge Gilman, the individual West Virginia
consumers were the real parties in interest regarding count 11.70
Judge Gilman also noted that the attorney general's action was "essentially
identical" to claims filed in other states by private attorneys against the
62. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 422-23.
63. Id. at 423.
64. Id. at 429. The court in Caldwell stated:
[A] party is a real party in interest when it is "directly and personally concerned in the
outcome of the litigation to the extent that his participation therein will insure 'a genuine
adversary issue between the parties.'"... "Such an interest is lacking when a state
undertakes to sue for the particular benefit of a limited number of citizens."
Id. at 428 (quoting Land O'Lakes Creameries v. La. State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp. 387, 388
(E.D. La. 1958)) (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 430. The court in Caldwell left it to the discretion of the district court to decide
whether to remand all of the claims or sever the claims and remand only the treble damages claim.
Id. (citing In re Katrina Canal Litigation Breaches, 524 F.3d 700, 711-12 (5th Cir. 2008)).
Although the court in Caldwell did not address the provision in CAFA regarding mass actions and
actions brought on behalf of the public, presumably the court did not believe it applied since in the
court's view the real parties in interest were the policyholders with regard to the claim for treble
damages, and the action was brought on behalf of those individuals. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(III) (2006); Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 429, 430. See supra note 19 for a discussion
of the requirements of a mass action under CAFA.
66. McGraw, 646 F.3d at 181 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 181-82.
68. Id. at 182.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 182-83.
1106 [VOL. 63: 1099
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Pharmacies.71 In looking to the legislative history, Judge Gilman found support
in certain floor statements regarding a proposed amendment to CAFA that would
exempt "all class actions filed by state attorneys general from removal under
CAFA."72  The amendment, which was ultimately defeated, was opposed
because there was concern that the amendment would create a risk "where State
attorneys general can be used as pawns so that crafty class action lawyers can
avoid [removal under CAFA]. '73 In Judge Gilman's opinion, that concern had
11 74"come to fruition" with the present case.
Discussing the Rule 23 requirements that the majority found lacking in the
WVCCPA, Judge Gilman stated that "CAFA does not require such exactitude"
and pointed to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on CAFA and its
statements indicating that "the definition of a class action should be interpreted
liberally., 75  According to Judge Gilman, "the majority's conclusion that the
[a]ttorney [gleneral cannot be a class representative because he has not literally
been injured is too narrow of a reading of class representation." 76 Judge Gilman
noted that the Fifth Circuit did not even address this issue in Caldwell, but
instead found that the suit was "brought in a representative capacity on behalf of
those who allegedly suffered harm.
' 7
Judge Gilman then distinguished General Telephone and Edmond cited by
the majority. He found that unlike Title VII at issue in General Telephone,
under which suits are brought "to vindicate public interest," 78 the relief under
WVCCPA § 46A-7-111(1) is "solely for the benefit of the aggrieved
consumer. ' 79 In his opinion, Edmond was also distinguishable because unlike
the Maryland Consumer Protection Act at issue in that case where a "private
action is 'in addition' to any action by the [attorney general]," 80 the West
Virginia Attorney General's authority "under WVCCPA § 46A-7-111(1) is
dependent on whether the consumer files his or her own suit." 81 Thus, Judge
71. Id. at 182.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting 151 CONG. REc. S1157, S1163 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Chuck Grassley)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 183 (quoting West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Comcast Corp., 705 F. Supp. 2d 441,
452 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 35 (2005), reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34).
76. McGraw, 646 F.3d at 183-84 (Gillman, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 184 (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 430 (5th
Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1312 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
81. Id. at 184-85. The WVCCPA provides that if an individual citizen commences his or her
own suit to recover the excess charges then "an action by the attorney general to recover for the
same excess charge shall be stayed while the consumer's action is pending and shall be dismissed if
1107
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Gilman concluded that "[t]he [a]ttorney [gleneral's power over a particular
generic-drug purchaser's claim is ... ultimately controlled by the consumer."
82
Judge Gilman, therefore, believed that WVCCPA § 46A-7-111 was sufficiently
similar to Rule 23, and that the jurisdictional requirements of CAFA were met,
which would allow the case to be removed to federal court.
83
Judge Gilman also addressed the sovereign immunity issues cited by the
majority. "[B]ecause West Virginia voluntarily brought [the] lawsuit, [Judge
Gilman saw] no Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity concerns in
asserting federal jurisdiction over [the] case. '84 In conclusion, Judge Gilman
stated: "[Ilf something looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a
duck, it is probably a duck .... [T]his case 'quacks' much more like a CAFA
class action than a parens patriae case."
85
II1. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
On August 18, 2011, the Pharmacies filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court.86 The Supreme Court denied the Pharmacies' petition
on November 28, 2011.87
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit opinion in McGraw is an important addition to class
action jurisprudence. In spite of the lack of guidance found in CAFA, the Fourth
Circuit has fashioned a reasonable approach to analyzing the issue with the
formulation of its standard. By requiring that an action brought under a state
statute be representative in nature and satisfy the four criteria of Rule 23(a) in
order to be a class action, the court has provided a reliable framework for the
district courts in the Fourth Circuit to ensure consistent results regarding this
issue.
The majority opinion in McGraw is consistent with, and has been endorsed
in, decisions by both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.8 8 In LG Display Co. v.
89Madigan, the Seventh Circuit held that an action brought by the Illinois
the consumer's action is dismissed with prejudice or results in a final judgment." W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46A-7-111(1) (LexisNexis 2007).




86. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. State of West Virginia ex rel.
McGraw (No. 11-224), 2011 WL 3706738.
87. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. State of West Virginia ex rel. McGraw, 132 S. Ct. 761, 761
(2011).
88. The Fifth Circuit is the only other circuit beside the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
to address the issue at the time of this writing, see supra notes 61-65, 77 and accompanying text.
89. 665 F.3d768(7th Cir. 2011).
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Attorney General against LCD panel manufacturers for antitrust violations under
an Illinois statute, in which the attorney general sought injunctive relief, civil
penalties, and treble damages for both the state and individual consumers, was
neither a mass action nor a class action under CAFA.9° The court held that the
action by the Illinois Attorney General was not a class action under CAFA
because the attorney general was not a member of the class and the Illinois
statute did not contain any of the pivotal requirements for a class action under
Rule 23.91 The court found that the suit was not a mass action under CAFA
because only the Illinois Attorney General made a claim for damages under the
Illinois statute; thus, the "claims of 100 or more persons" requirement could not
be met.92  Moreover, the "suit is not a mass action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii(Im) if 'all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of
the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of the
purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such
action."'
93
In Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.,94 the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Fourth Circuit's analysis and held that actions filed by the Attorneys General of
Washington and California alleging antitrust violations against LCD panel
manufacturers under state statutes in which the state attorneys general sought
damages for state residents, were not class actions under CAFA. 95 The court
found that the state statutes at issue did not authorize an action as a class action
and neither statute was similar to Rule 23 because the statutes lacked the central
requirements of Rule 23.96
The holdings of the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits stand for the
proposition that parens patriae styled actions are not likely to be considered
class actions under CAFA, and that a state statute which does not contain the
central requirements for a class action under Rule 23(a) will not be a "similar"
statute under CAFA. Moreover, if an action authorized by statute is properly
brought as a parens patriae action, pursuant to a state's quasi-sovereign interest,
the language in CAFA would seem to expressly exclude such actions from the
mass action prong of CAFA.97 Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Caldwell, there is no split among the appellate courts regarding whether parens
patriae styled actions are class actions under CAFA, as the Fifth Circuit in
90. Id. at 770, 774. The Seventh Circuit expressly disagreed with the claim-by-claim
approach utilized by the Fifth Circuit in Caldwell. Id. at 773.
91. Id. at 772. The court made this holding despite the fact that the Illinois statute explicitly
references the type of action as a class action. See id. at 771-72 (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 107(2) (West 1993)).
92. See id. at 772 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)( 11)(B)(i) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
93. Id. (quoting § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii)(II1)).
94. 659 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2011).
95. Id. at 846, 849-50.
96. Id. at 849-50 (quoting § 1332(d)(1)).
97. See Madigan, 665 F.3d at 772 (quoting § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III)).
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Caldwell only held that the action in that case constituted a mass action under
CAFA and declined to .decide whether such an action was a class action.
98
However, regarding mass actions, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Caldwell and
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Madigan do appear to be in conflict. Thus,
while the Supreme Court recently declined to hear the McGraw case, perhaps the
Court will address CAFA and parens patriae styled actions in the context of
mass actions at some point in the immediate future.
Marshall P. Walker
98. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 430 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Since
we have concluded that this case was properly removed under CAFA's 'mass action' provision, we
need not address whether this lawsuit could.., properly proceed as a class action under CAFA.");
see also In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 2012 WL 10552, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012)
(stating that the Caldwell opinion is not at odds with the other federal circuits' opinions regarding
class actions). Further, there seems to be a recent growing consensus among federal district courts
that these types of parens patriae styled actions by state attorneys general are not class actions or
mass actions subject to removal under CAFA. See, e.g., Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-
15005, 2012 WL 688552, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2012) (citing Chimei, 659 F.3d at 847) (finding
parens patriae enforcement suits filed by the attorney general were not class action suits under
CAFA); Vioxx, 2012 WL 10552, at *1, *8 (holding that an action by the Kentucky Attorney General
was not a class action); South Carolina v. LG Display Co., No. 3:1 1-cv--00729-JFA, 2011 WL
4344074, at *1, *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2011) (quoting West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS
Pharmacy, Inc., 646 F.3d 169, 172 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 761 (2011)) (holding that
an action by the South Carolina Attorney General was neither a class action nor a mass action);
South Carolina v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 3:11-cv-007131-JFA, 2011 WL 4344079, at *1, *7
(D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2011) (quoting McGraw, 646 F.3d at 172) (holding that an action by the South
Carolina Attorney General was neither a class action nor a mass action); Arizona v. Countrywide
Fin. Corp., No. CV-11-131-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 995963, at *1, *3 (D. Ariz. March 21, 2011)
(holding that an action by the Arizona Attorney General was neither a class action nor a mass
action); Connecticut v. Moody's Corp., No. 3:10cv546(JBA), 2011 WL 63905, at *1, *4 (D. Conn.
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